Ballmer and the Windows end-run

Funny interview with Steve Ballmer in the New York Times. Excerpt:

Q. What was the lesson learned in Windows Vista? After all, it wasn’t supposed to ship more than five years after Windows XP.

A. No. No, it wasn’t. We tried to re-engineer every piece of Windows in one big bang. That was the original post-Windows XP design philosophy. And it wasn’t misshapen. It wasn’t executed, but it wasn’t misshapen. We said, let’s try to give them a new file system and a new presentation system and a new user interface all at the same time. It’s not like we had them and were just trying to integrate them. We were trying to develop and integrate at the same time. And that was beyond the state of the art.

Q. In the future, will the software model change? Will the Internet, for example, be the way most software is distributed?

A. That will happen. It’ll happen from us. It’ll happen from everybody.

Q. Doesn’t that mean that software product cycles are going to be much shorter, months instead of years?

A. Things will change at different paces. There are aspects of our Office Live service, for example, that change every three months, four months, six months. And there are aspects that are still not going to change but every couple of years. The truth of the matter is that some big innovations — and it’s a little like having a baby — can’t happen in under a certain amount of time. And, you know, Google doesn’t change their core search algorithms every month. It’s just not done…

Debugging Vista and Office

John Markoff has an interesting piece in the New York Times about the frenzied efforts within Microsoft to get Vista ready to ship. The article has some interesting statistics. For example, it quotes the Gartner Group as claiming that Windows runs on 845 million computers worldwide and Office on more than 450 million.

Markoff claims that

it was the vast scale of the Windows testing program that saved the software development projects. Over the summer, the company began an extraordinary bug-tracking effort, abetted by volunteers and corporate partners who ran free copies of both Windows and Office designed to send data detailing each crash back to Microsoft computers.

The Office package, for example, has been tested by more than 3.5 million users; last month alone, more than 700,000 PC’s were running the software, generating more than 46 million separate work sessions. At Microsoft, 53,000 employee computers are running test versions.

Vista has also been tested extensively. More than half a million computer users have installed Vista test software, and 450,000 of the systems have sent crash data back to Microsoft.

One interesting question is how Microsoft manages to cope with the torrent of data that comes back from all these test versions. Markoff says that The test data from the second beta release of Vista alone generated 5.5 petabytes of information — “the equivalent of the storage capacity of 690,000 home PC’s”.

Later… James Miller points out that the last calculation — which is the work of the New York Times, not me — implies that the average home PC has a hard disk of 8GB capacity, which seems implausible. If we assume that the average PC now has 80GB of hard disk space, then 5.5 petabytes equates to 68,500 PCs. Looks like a decimal point went missing somewhere.

Every little helps?

According to today’s Guardian, Tesco is moving into software…

First Wal-Mart. Now Microsoft. There is, it seems, no global giant that Tesco is not prepared to take on.

While a new division of the UK’s biggest grocer is currently working on a £250m plan to open 150 supermarkets in the mighty Wal-Mart’s US backyard, the supermarket chain is also about to launch a range of own-brand software that will compete head on with the company whose products are loaded into 95% of the world’s computers.

Tesco is aiming to substantially undercut Microsoft, offering software titles for less than £20. It claims to be the first retailer to offer a range of own-label software, taking the same approach to the world of technology as grocers have traditionally taken to baked beans and soap powder. The initial range includes an office suite, two security/anti-virus products, a personal finance tool, CD/DVD burners, and a photo editing product. Microsoft Office sells for up to £300.

The Tesco software will be available in more than 100 Tesco stores from this month, with plans to roll out the range across the UK over the coming year. It will complement Tesco’s entry into the computer hardware market earlier this year…

Hmmm…. This may be less exciting than it appears. The software will be provided by an outfit called Formjet, a Cambridge-based organisation which “acquires territorial rights to ‘alternative’ software products, and markets, sells, distributes and supports these products in place of the vendor in the UK”. The office software Tesco will be selling is a suite written by Ability. It retails already in the UK for £29. So basically, this isn’t about Tesco getting into software, just about Tesco selling other people’s software, much as it sells other companies’ baked beans. Still, it’ll be interesting to see if the supermarket giant’s formidable marketing power can dent the MS Office monopoly in the UK.

Microsoft vs. Open Source

Two Harvard economists have built a model to elucidate the battle between Windows and Linux. There’s an interesting interview with the authors in which they discuss their findings.

Their conclusion?

Our main result is that in the absence of cost asymmetries and as long as Windows has a first-mover advantage (a larger installed base at time zero), Linux never displaces Windows of its leadership position. This result holds true regardless of the strength of Linux’s demand-side learning. Furthermore, the result persists regardless of the intrinsically better design and potential differential value of Linux. In other words, harnessing demand-side learning more efficiently is not sufficient for Linux to win the competitive battle against Windows.

Having obtained this basic result, we investigate the conditions that will warrant that Linux ends up forcing Windows out. We do this by modifying the model in two ways. First of all, we look at the effect of having buyers such as governments and some large corporations committed to deployment of Linux in their organizations. We call such buyers strategic. In addition to cost-related reasons, governments back Linux because having access to the source code allows them to verify that sensitive data is treated securely. Binary code makes it hard to figure out who has access to information flowing in a network. Companies such as IBM, in contrast, back Linux because they see in OSS one way to diminish Microsoft’s dominance. We find that the presence of strategic buyers together with Linux’s sufficiently strong demand-side learning results in Windows being driven out of the market. This may be one main reason why Microsoft has been providing chunks of Windows’ source code to governments.

Second, we look at the role of cost asymmetries. In the base model we assume that the cost structures of Windows and Linux for the development, distribution, and support of software coincide. A natural question is then whether the central result that Windows survives in the long-run equilibrium regardless of the speed of Linux’s demand-side learning persists if there are cost asymmetries. We find that because OSS implies lower profits for Microsoft, the larger the cost differences are between Linux and Windows, the less able Microsoft is to guarantee the survival of Windows.

We also show that it is not all bad news to Microsoft. We analyze the effect of having forward-looking buyers and the presence of piracy, and conclude that both benefit Microsoft.

They also come to the counter-intuitive conclusion that piracy actually helps Microsoft!

n addition to this main result, we were also surprised to find that piracy may end up increasing Microsoft’s profits. To understand why, notice that there are two types of pirates: those who would not have bought Windows in the first place because it is too expensive, and those who would have bought Windows but now decide to pirate it. The first category increases Windows’ installed base without affecting sales. As a consequence, this group increases the value of Windows. And thanks to these pirates, Microsoft is able to set higher prices in the future (because the value of the system goes up). In addition, having these pirates means that Linux’s installed base does not grow as much as it would have if piracy weren’t there. The second type of pirates (those who in the absence of piracy would have bought Windows) reduces Windows’ sales and profit. Thus, if the proportion of first-type pirates is sufficiently large, Microsoft’s profits will increase with piracy…

One can almost hear the sighs of relief in Redmond. The only problem is that the entire hypothesis depends on the accuracy of a mathematical model.

The Vista trauma

This morning’s Observer column

Well, the long wait is nearly over. Microsoft’s elephantine parturition has produced an heir. Last week the company distributed ‘Release Candidate 1’ (RC1) of Vista, the new incarnation of Windows, to about 5 million favoured customers. Think of it as the final beta of the software. Microsoft says it is still on course to deliver a version to corporate customers in November, followed by a consumer release to high-street dealers in January.

Microsoft also released details of US pricing for the new operating system. The ‘Home Basic’ version will cost $199. ‘Home Premium’ comes at $239. ‘Vista Business’ is priced at $299. And ‘Vista Ultimate’ weighs in at a whopping $399. Security vulnerabilities come free with all versions. There is also to be a ‘Vista Starter’ edition which will be marketed to people in poor countries in a futile attempt to stop them pirating Vista Ultimate and selling it on the streets of Shanghai, Bangkok and Singapore for a dollar a pop…

Gartner: Microsoft must turn to virtualization technology

From an interesting InformationWeek piece

Microsoft’s mistakes in Vista’s development have been well-chronicled, and the company’s leaders recognize that another five-year gap between major updates of their money maker could be disastrous. In July, chief executive Steve Ballmer told financial analysts “we will never repeat our experience with Windows Vista, we will never have a five-year gap between major releases of flagship products.”

But exactly how will Microsoft do this? How can it handle the increasingly unwieldy amount of code in Windows, better secure the operating system, and maintain backward compatibility with the legions of legacy applications? Gartner’s Gammage and two colleagues, Michael Silver and David Mitchell Smith, believe they know.

“Microsoft will have to move toward virtualization at its core to change direction,” said Gammage. “We think this is what will happen. Microsoft, at the moment, disagrees with us.

“But we don’t see another way of doing this.”

In the scheme that Gammage sees playing out, Microsoft will be forced into adding a “hypervisor,” a layer of virtualization software that runs between the operating system and hardware, to Vista by no later than 2009. Virtualization-enabled processors and chipsets, such as the newer offerings from both Intel and AMD, allow hypervisors to run, which in turn let developers separate functions of an OS into chunks, then have those pieces run simultaneously in multiple virtual machine partitions.

“We expect this hypervisor to provide the key enabling technology for reversing the trend in functional integration,” wrote Gammage, Silver, and Smith in a research report they issued nearly two weeks ago.

“This is how Microsoft will be able to deal with 25 years of backward compatibility,” Gammage said. Virtualization, he said will allow a future Windows to run the legacy kernel — to support aged applications — alongside a new kernel, just as current virtual machine technologies let users run different operating systems side-by-side…

Anyone wondering why Xensource is going to be such a Big Deal need look no further. They’ve cracked the hypervisor problem. And the delicious irony is that their core technology is open source!

Microsoft Vista prices

Microsoft has announced the US pricing regime for the latest incarnation of Windows:

  • Windows Vista Home Basic: $199
  • Windows Vista Home Premium: $239
  • Windows Vista Business: $299
  • Windows Vista Ultimate: $399

    Security vulnerabilities thrown in at no extra charge.

    Don’t you just love the nomenclature — Basic, Premium, Business, Ultimate. No Latte, though.

  • New from Google — Microsoft Office Live

    Well, not quite — yet. But you can see where they’re headed.

    Now you can offer private-labeled email, IM and calendar tools to all of your users for free*, so they can share ideas and get things done more effectively. You can design and publish your organization’s website, too. It’s all hosted by Google, so there’s no hardware or software for you to install or maintain…

    Google is making a particular pitch at educational institutions. For example:

    Get your campus talking

    Sharing information and ideas is vital to learning. So imagine how valuable it would be if your entire campus community shared a set of powerful, easy-to-use and integrated communication and collaboration services. With Google Apps for Education, you can offer all of your students innovative email, instant messaging, and calendaring, all for free.* You can select any combination of our available services (see below), and customize them with your school’s logo, color scheme and content. You can manage your users through an easy web-based console or use our available APIs to integrate the services into your existing systems — and it’s all hosted by Google, so there’s no hardware or software for you to install or maintain…

    That Windows Live parrot is, er, deceased

    Niall Kennedy, a self-confessed “RSS syndication geek” who was hired by Microsoft a few months ago to spearhead the company’s leap into the world of syndication, is leaving Redmond on August 18. Here’s why.

    I joined Microsoft in April excited to change the world and build an Internet-scale feed platform to power the experience of Microsoft’s hundreds of millions of users as well as opening up the feed experience to outside developers to leverage in their own applications. The opportunity presented to me was extremely unique and a way to change how the world interacts with syndication technologies such as RSS, RDF, and Atom. The launch of Windows Live and Ray Ozzie’s vision of Internet services disruption made me believe Microsoft was serious about the space and not being left behind in yet another emerging industry as they had been with the web browser and search.

    The Windows Live initiative got off to a huge start, with lots of new services created and an “invest to win” strategy in the new division. There were so many new programs created and headcount opening up Microsoft told Wall Street it would be spending $2 billion more than anticipated in the short-term to cover these new costs including over 10,000 new hires over the last fiscal year.

    The stock plummeted on the announcement Microsoft did not have its costs under control. Microsoft’s market cap lost close to $59 billion in the six weeks after I joined and second quarter financials were released, more than the GDP of Ecuador and over half the market cap of Google. What do you do when the market responds to your 6 month-old online services strategy by reducing your valuation by 1.5 Yahoos? Windows Live is under some heavy change, reorganization, pullback, and general paralysis and unfortunately my ability to perform, hire, and execute was completely frozen as well….

    Vista bugs not stable yet

    From Good Morning Silicon Valley

    Some of Microsoft’s closest friends are warning the company in public what they surely must have been telling it privately — that the long-awaited and long-delayed Vista update of Windows still needs a lot of work. And if that’s true, Microsoft is impaled on the tines of a Morton’s Fork.

    Robert McLaws, a .NET developer and Vista beta tester and blogger lays out a picture of a still-unstable Beta 2 version vs. a deadline crunch that just invites mistakes. “I’ve been defending Microsoft’s ship schedule for Windows Vista for quite some time. Up to this point, I’ve been confident that Vista would be at the quality level it needs to be by RC1 [Release Candidate 1] to make the launch fantastic. Having tested several builds between Beta 2 and today, I hate to say that I no longer feel that way. Beta 2 was a disappointment on many levels. It was nowhere near as stable as it should have been, and was a huge memory hog.” McLaws advises pushing the launch from January (see “Don’t you know Lunar New Year is the new Christmas?”) to the end of February, adding a Beta 3 version and taking the inevitable heat. “Don’t defend it, just announce it. There’s no point in trying to put a PR spin on it, because nobody is going to listen anyways. Let your thousands of beta testers cheer you for making the right decision, and tell Wall Street to go to hell,” he writes. Among those bobbing in agreement was Robert Scoble, until recently Microsoft’s voice in the blogosphere. “If this ships [to the factory] in October, I will recommend not installing it and waiting for the first service pack. There’s no way the quality will be high enough to trust it if it ships early. I hope Microsoft takes the time to do this right.”…

    And if, like me, you were wondering what Morton’s Fork was, well here’s the Answers.com explanation:

    Morton’s Fork is an expression that describes a choice between two equally unpleasant alternatives, or two lines of reasoning that lead to the same unpleasant conclusion. It is analogous to the expressions “between the devil and the deep sea” or “from the frying pan to the fire”.

    The expression originates from a policy of tax collection devised by John Morton, Lord Chancellor in 1487, under the rule of Henry VII. His approach was that if the subject lived in luxury and had clearly spent a lot of money on himself, he obviously had sufficient income to spare for the king. Alternatively, if the subject lived frugally, and showed no sign of being wealthy, he must have had substantial savings and could therefore afford to give it to the king. These arguments were the two prongs of the fork and regardless of whether the subject was rich or poor, he didn’t have a favourable choice.

    Hmmm… I’d have said Hobson’s Choice if I’d been writing the piece.

    Later… The learned Bill Thompson writes:

    The fork is a more appropriate metaphor than Hobson’s choice since it’s not that Microsoft has no choice – as the good innkeeper would have it – but that it is going to suffer whether or not it delays shipping. A real dilemma – a thesis that has two solutions :-)

    He’s right, as usual.