Apart from that, Mrs Clinton, what did you think of the cables?

One thing that has been oddly downplayed amid the rage, indignation, etc. triggered by Cablegate is the actual content of the cables themselves. I’ve read only a fraction of them — mostly the ones published by the Guardian — but what comes across mostly is the evidence they provide of the quiet professionalism of US diplomats. These public servants are seen doing their job of listening conscientiously to what they hear in the countries to which they are assigned, and relaying it back to their masters in Washington. Sometimes, it’s clear that they are speaking unpalatable truths to power, because what they find on the ground is not what Washington wants to hear. Or what their informants wish to hear, either.

Take for example the way in which Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, found himself playing a minor role in the cables emanating from the London Embassy. In a conversation with the US Ambassador prior to the UK election, King had professed himself underwhelmed by David Cameron and George Osborne. They had, he told the Ambassador, a “tendency to think about issues only in terms of politics, and how they might affect Tory electorability”.

Many former diplomats have pooh-poohed the revelations in the cables saying that there was nothing in them that was new. The clear implication was that most of this stuff was commonplace in diplomatic circles. Well, maybe it was, but that misses the point entirely. They may have known this stuff but we — i.e. the schmucks who are paying their salaries — didn’t. And sometimes that really matters. For example, I’ve been pissed off for years at the fact that the biggest supporters of Al Qaeda are the Saudis. I’m even more pissed off to learn not only that the US State Department also knows that but that the King of that corrupt and dysfunctional state wants the US to bomb Iran on his behalf.

Sometimes the cables have revealed occasions when the diplomats on the ground have been telling the truth but their Washington masters have been engaging in what looks like lying. Consider the case of US Military operations in Yemen. Here is an excerpt from the transcript of the State Department daily briefing for December 15, 2009, given by P.J. Crowley, who is an Assistant Secretary of State.

QUESTION: On the conflict in Yemen, Houthis say that U.S. warplanes have launched airstrikes in northern Yemen. Is the U.S. involved in any military operations in Yemen?

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: No?

MR. CROWLEY: But we – those kinds of reports keep cropping up. We do not have a military role in this conflict.

QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.

And now here’s an excerpt from a January 2010 cable describing a meeting between Gen. David Petraeus and President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, in which they discuss U.S. airstrikes.

President Obama has approved providing U.S. intelligence in support of ROYG [Republic of Yemen government] ground operations against AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted coolly, however, to the General’s proposal to place USG [U.S. government] personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time, direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] platforms overhead. “You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in the joint operations center,” Saleh responded. Any U.S. casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts, Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however, to General Petraeus’ proposal to move away from the use of cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside Yemeni territory, “out of sight,” and engage AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] targets when actionable intelligence became available. Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are “not very accurate” and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed precision-guided bombs instead. “We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,” Saleh said, prompting Deputy Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just “lied” by telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.

According to Salon,

The three strikes mentioned at the end there each occurred in December 2009, the month before the cable was written. The Dec. 17 Abyan attack killed 55 people, 41 one of whom were civilians, including 21 children Amnesty International later reported. Amnesty had also suspected that a U.S. cruise missile was used in the attack because of images of debris found at the scene. This new cable seems to bear out that suspicion.

It’s possible, given that the cable wasn’t sent until January, that Mr Crowley’s replies — given in December — might have been provided in good faith, because the Pentagon hadn’t shared information about what it was up to in Yemen. (After all, one of the defining characteristics of the George W. Bush presidency was the way State was sidelined by the Pentagon.) But what the cable does conclusively show is that the US administration has been very economical with the truth in relation to what it’s doing in Yemen.

Another thing that comes across in the cables is their authors’ obvious belief in American exceptionalism; they do genuinely appear to believe that America is exceptional in its commitment to democracy and human rights, and seem confident that American power is generally applied on the side of justice. In a useful round-up piece in the New York Times, Stephen Erlanger, quoted a well-known French journalist, who had the same thought:

Renaud Girard, a respected reporter for the center-right Le Figaro, said that he was impressed by the generally high quality of the American diplomatic corps. “What is most fascinating is that we see no cynicism in U.S. diplomacy,” he said. “They really believe in human rights in Africa and China and Russia and Asia. They really believe in democracy and human rights. People accuse the Americans of double standards all the time. But it’s not true here. If anything, the diplomats are almost naïve, and I don’t think these leaks will jeopardize the United States. Most will see the diplomats as honest, sincere and not so cynical.”

“This is charming”, says the Economist.

Most Americans don’t grasp the extent to which their country is considered throughout the world a bullying, opportunistic, imperialist power. Mr Girard sounds almost surprised by the “almost naïve” sincerity of American diplomats’ commitment to democracy and human rights. And I think he is right that the intelligence, good humour, and benevolent intentions on display in the cables redounds to the benefit of the American foreign service’s reputation.

The problem is that much of the rest of the world doesn’t see the US in quite that way. They tend to Churchill’s view: that the United States “can always be trusted to do the right thing — once it has exhausted all the other alternatives”.

But, argues the Economist,

Americans by and large trust their military, their foreign service, and even their spy agencies basically because all of them are full of Americans. If the good patriots keeping the world safe for democracy feel they need to keep certain things secret, then they need to keep certain things secret. To splash those secrets all over the internet is simply to interfere with America’s attempt to carry its noble burden, to perform its urgent and necessary task, to make the world a little less safe for democracy. What kind of person would do that?

All of which explains, I suppose, why so many Americans think that WikiLeaks is akin to a terrorist organisation. Sadly, it also explains why they are getting so many things wrong.

LATER: Gideon Rachman, writing in the FT, adds a few more things the cables have told us:

1. The sheer bleakness of America’s view of Russia – and this despite all the happy talk of improved relations and a “reset”.

2. Hillary Clinton’s concern about America’s reliance on Chinese purchases of US Treasuries. In conversation with the aforesaid Rudd, she uses the line “how do you get tough with your banker?”

3. Suggestions that American troops have been embedded with Pakistani troops in the fight in the tribal areas.

4. The delicious confirmation that Britain’s Prince Andrew is, indeed, a complete oaf.

Cloud computing and democracy: Amazon and WikiLeaks

This week’s Observer column.

As Markus Kuhn, a computer security researcher at the Cambridge Computer Lab, pointed out to me, any work “prepared by an officer or employee of the US government as part of that person’s official duties” is not entitled to domestic copyright protection under US law. So, in the US at least, the leaked cables are not protected by copyright and it doesn’t matter whether WikiLeaks owns the rights or not.

But, in a way, that’s the least worrying aspect of Amazon’s behaviour. More troubling is what its actions portend for democracy. Rebecca MacKinnon, a scholar who has written incisively about China’s efforts to censor the net, wrote a sobering essay about this last week. “A substantial, if not critical amount of our political discourse,” she points out, “has moved into the digital realm. This realm is largely made up of virtual spaces that are created, owned and operated by the private sector.”

As far as the law of contract is concerned, Amazon can do what it likes. But this isn’t just about contracts any more. “While Amazon was within its legal rights,” MacKinnon warns, “the company has nonetheless sent a clear signal to its users: if you engage in controversial speech that some individual members of the US government don’t like… Amazon is going to dump you at the first sign of trouble.”

Yep. For years people have extolled cloud computing as the way of the future. The lesson of the last week is simple: be careful what you wish for.

Dan Gillmor has a good piece about this over on Salon.com. Excerpt:

That’s Strike 1 to our faith in the Internet. We are all, to one degree or another, forced to rely on the good will of larger enterprises that host and serve the media we create online. So when a company as big as Amazon — and it’s huge in the Web services arena — yanks down content this way, it is demonstrating that we cannot fully trust it with our content, either. And if Amazon, a powerful enterprise, can be bullied, which one can’t?

Quote of the week

“In media history up to now, the press is free to report on what the powerful wish to keep secret because the laws of a given nation protect it. But Wikileaks is able to report on what the powerful wish to keep secret because the logic of the Internet permits it. This is new.”

Jay Rosen.

WikiLeaks: two challenges for journalism

Simon Andrewes came to Cambridge last week to give an interesting talk in our Arcadia Seminar series on how the organisation of BBC News has changed over the last decade in response to the need to make financial savings and to address the demands of our emerging media ecosystem. One of the things that interested me particularly was his sketch of the powerful tools the BBC is building to enable its journalists to keep on top of complex, fast-moving stories. Among other things, these new IT tools enable the Beeb to create ‘story communities’ based on its staff across the world who are working on aspects of a big story.

The WikiLeaks controversy is, par excellence, such a story and, like many bloggers, academics and media commentators, I’ve been struggling to (a) keep up with it, and (b) make sense of it. Neither task is easy. Here’s a concept map I drew when first thinking about it. (Click on the map to see a more readable version.)

And this is just a very incomplete sketch of it. Yet onto each blob on the map I could map dozens of cogent references, commentaries and websites. So merely ‘keeping up’ with the story is a Herculean, not to say Sisyphean, task.

The second great challenge is how to make sense of all this. Most people cope with this problem by, effectively, reducing its variety. They decide to take a particular view — which enables them to slash a path through the thicket by choosing which aspects to pay attention to, and which to ignore. But what if one declines to take this simplifying route?

We need tools to help with this.

Sensemaking is what my Open University colleague Simon Buckingham-Shum has been working on for years. He calls it knowledge cartography and has developed tools like Compendium, a software tool for mapping information, ideas and arguments. This screencast gives a good overview of what’s involved in using the tool.

UPDATES:
1. The concept map has been updated to remove an incorrect reference to EasyDNS. Wikileaks’s provider of DNS services was EveryDNS. Thanks to everyone who pointed out the error.

2. Interesting visualisation of data about the leaked cables here.

WikiLeaks: five expert opinions

The New York Times has a thoughtful set of contributions from various experts on the significance of the WikiLeaks disclosures.

Evgeny Morozov, a Stanford scholar who has a book about the “dark side of Internet freedom” coming out in January, ponders the likelihood that WikiLeaks can be duplicated, and finds it unlikely.

A thousand other Web sites dedicated to leaking are unlikely to have the same effect as WikiLeaks: it would take a lot of time and effort to cultivate similar relationships with the media. Most other documents leaked to WikiLeaks do not carry the same explosive potential as candid cables written by American diplomats.

One possible future for WikiLeaks is to morph into a gigantic media intermediary — perhaps, even something of a clearing house for investigative reporting — where even low-level leaks would be matched with the appropriate journalists to pursue and report on them and, perhaps, even with appropriate N.G.O.’s to advocate on their causes. Under this model, WikiLeaks staffers would act as idea salesmen relying on one very impressive digital Rolodex.

Ron Deibert from the University of Toronto thinks that the “venomous furor” surrounding WikiLeaks, including charges of “terrorism” and calls for the assassination of Julian Assange, has to rank as “one of the biggest temper tantrums in recent years”.

Many lament the loss of individual privacy as we leave digital traces that are then harvested and collated by large organizations with ever-increasing precision. But if individuals are subject to this new ecosystem, what would make anyone think governments or organizations are immune? Blaming WikiLeaks for this state of affairs is like blaming a tremor for tectonic plate shifts.

Certainly a portion of that anger could be mitigated by the conduct of WikiLeaks itself. The cult of personality around Assange, his photoshopped image now pasted across the WikiLeaks Web site, only plays into this animosity. So do vigilante cyberattacks carried out by supporters of WikiLeaks that contribute to a climate of lawlessness and vengeance seeking. If everyone can blast Web sites and services with which they disagree into oblivion — be it WikiLeaks or MasterCard — a total information war will ensue to the detriment of the public sphere.

An organization like WikiLeaks should professionalize and depersonalize itself as much as possible. It should hold itself to the highest possible ethical standards. It should act with the utmost discretion in releasing into the public domain otherwise classified information that comes its way only on the basis of an obvious transgression of law or morality. This has not happened.

Ross Anderson, who is Professor of Security Engineering at Cambridge and the author of the standard textbook on building dependable distributed information systems, thinks that the WikiLeaks saga shows how governments never take an architectural view of security.

Your medical records should be kept in the hospital where you get treated; your bank statements should only be available in the branch you use; and while an intelligence analyst dealing with Iraq might have access to cables on Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, he should have no routine access to information on Korea or Zimbabwe or Brazil. But this is in conflict with managers’ drive for ever broader control and for economies of scale.

The U.S. government has been unable to manage this trade-off, leading to regular upsets and reversals of policy. Twenty years ago, Aldrich Ames betrayed all the C.I.A.’s Russian agents; intelligence data were then carefully compartmentalized for a while. Then after 9/11, when it turned out that several of the hijackers were already known to parts of the intelligence community, data sharing was commanded. Security engineers old enough to remember Ames expected trouble, and we got it.

What’s next? Will risk aversion drive another wild swing of the pendulum, or might we get some clearer thinking about the nature and limits of power?

James Bamford, a writer and documentary producer specializing in intelligence and national security issues, thinks that the WikiLeaks disclosures are useful in forcing governments to confess.

A generation ago, government employees with Communist sympathies worried security officials. Today, after years of torture reports, black sites, Abu Ghraib, and a war founded on deception, it is the possibility that more employees might act out from a sense of moral outrage that concerns officials.

There may be more employees out there willing to leak, they fear, and how do you weed them out? Spies at least had the courtesy to keep the secrets to themselves, rather than distribute them to the world’s media giants. In a sense, WikiLeaks is forcing the U.S. government into the confessional, with the door wide open. And confession, though difficult and embarrassing, can sometimes cleanse the soul.

Fred Alford is Professor of Government at the University of Maryland and thinks that neither the Web operation WikiLeaks, nor its editor-in-chief, Julian Assange, is a whistle-blower.

Whistle-blowers are people who observe what they believe to be unethical or illegal conduct in the places where they work and report it to the media. In so doing, they put their jobs at risk.

The whistle-blower in this case is Bradley Manning, an United States Army intelligence analyst who downloaded a huge amount of government classified information, which was made public by WikiLeaks. Whether or not Manning’s act serves the greater public interest is a contentious issue, but he has been arrested and charged with unlawful disclosure of classified data.

Some have compared the role of WikiLeaks to that of The New York Times in the publication of the Pentagon Papers several decades ago. WikiLeaks is the publishing platform that leverages the vast and instantaneous distribution capacity of the Internet.

The WikiLeaks data dump challenges a long held belief by many of us who study whistle-blowing — that it is important that the whistle-blower have a name and face so that the disclosures are not considered just anonymous griping, or possibly unethical activity. The public needs to see the human face of someone who stands up and does the right thing when none of his or her colleagues dare.

But he also thinks that “for better and worse, this changes whistle-blowing as we’ve known it.”

YouTube stats

According to this week’s Economist, “YouTube is now taking in 35-hours’ worth of video content every minute of the day, up from about six hours’-worth in June 2007”.

Wot — no links?

The website Catholic Online has an excellent precis of my Guardian piece about the significance of the WikiLeaks row. But strangely, one thing is missing: a link to the piece itself.

This doesn’t stop the site recommending that readers pass on its own piece to friends, including a link to Catholic.org.

This is not just discourteous; it’s also insulting to readers because it doesn’t give them an easy way of reading the original piece. After all, they might not agree with Deacon Fournier’s summary of my views. They might even think he had been too complimentary. All in all, bad Karma.

Amazon: why we dumped WikiLeaks

First of all, here’s the company’s explanation.

Amazon Web Services (AWS) rents computer infrastructure on a self-service basis. AWS does not pre-screen its customers, but it does have terms of service that must be followed. WikiLeaks was not following them. There were several parts they were violating. For example, our terms of service state that “you represent and warrant that you own or otherwise control all of the rights to the content… that use of the content you supply does not violate this policy and will not cause injury to any person or entity.” It’s clear that WikiLeaks doesn’t own or otherwise control all the rights to this classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of 250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in such a way as to ensure that they weren’t putting innocent people in jeopardy. Human rights organizations have in fact written to WikiLeaks asking them to exercise caution and not release the names or identities of human rights defenders who might be persecuted by their governments.

Analysis:

1. Amazon asserts that WikiLeaks didn’t own the content it was publishing.

2. Amazon asserts that its T&Cs require one to “warrant that … use of the content you supply … will not cause injury to any person or entity.” The company then goes on to state it is “not credible that the extraordinary volume of 250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in such a way as to ensure that they weren’t putting innocent people in jeopardy”.

I don’t have a problem with 1, which seems perfectly factual. By definition, WikiLeaks didn’t own the content of the cables. I’m no constitutional lawyer, but Claim #2 seems much more problematic. Amazon merely asserts that something is “not credible” and on the basis of that restricts WikiLeaks’s freedom of speech. On what grounds may a commercial company make a decision like that, in the US?