The ‘End of History’ Man redux

I’ve got far too many books to read at the moment, and so have been havering about whether to get Francis Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, partly because it seems very relevant to understanding why countries like Egypt stand a chance of becoming modern states while one’s like Libya and Bahrain don’t. Until this morning I had concluded that life is too short to read long books way outside of my field, but having read David Runciman’s absorbing review, now I’m not so sure.

Fukuyama’s new book is dominated by the influence of another of his mentors, the conservative Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington. Huntington is best known for his own cosmic soundbite – The Clash of Civilizations. But his main interest was in political order: how to achieve it and how to mess it up. Basically Huntington thought there are two things that could go wrong on the road to a well-ordered society. You could fail to get there because your society never gets beyond a condition of internecine conflict and incipient civil war. Or you could get there and find your society gets stuck in a rut and fails to adapt to new threats and challenges. Fukuyama takes this framework and applies it to the problem of democratic order. Why is it that some societies have gone down the democratic route to stability while others have remained stuck with autocracy? And will democracies be able to adapt to the new threats and challenges that they face?

Runciman provides a lucid and illuminating summary of Fukuyama’s argument, which I suppose might constitute an argument for not buying the book. Against that, he’s whetted my appetite for it. Damn.

Oh — and while I’m on the subject of understanding why some countries work and others do, there’s an interesting review by Pankaj Mishra of Anatol Lieven’s new book on Pakistan.

Approaching his subject as a trained anthropologist would, Lieven describes how Pakistan, though nominally a modern nation state, is still largely governed by the “traditions of overriding loyalty to family, clan and religion”. There is hardly an institution in Pakistan that is immune to “the rules of behavior that these loyalties enjoin”. These persisting ties of patronage and kinship, which are reminiscent of pre-modern Europe, indicate that the work of creating impersonal modern institutions and turning Pakistanis into citizens of a nation state – a long and brutal process in Europe, as Eugen Weber and others have shown – has barely begun.

The other half: Paul Allen’s autobiography

From my Observer review.

They say you can never be too thin, or too rich. After reading Paul Allen’s memoir, I’m not so sure – especially about the rich bit. After founding Microsoft in 1975 with his friend and schoolmate Bill Gates, Allen spent eight frenzied years building it into the corporate colossus that it is today. But then two things happened: he became ill with Hodgkin’s lymphoma; and he decided that life was too short to endure the perpetual conflict that comes with working with Bill Gates. And so he quit in 1983 (having rebuffed Gates’s offer to buy his Microsoft stock at a knockdown price), held on to his shares and has spent the rest of his life with his money (his net worth was $1bn in 1990 and was 13 times that in 1996).

His memoir, like his life, divides neatly into two parts, of which the first is by far the most engaging. Allen and Gates were schoolmates at the exclusive private Lakeside school in Seattle. Because of the school’s eccentric decision to install a terminal that was linked to a General Electric mainframe computer in a distant office, the two boys had a unique opportunity to teach themselves programming, and in relatively short order acquired more experience and expertise than most undergraduates at the time (the mid-1960s)…