So what’s Plan B then?

The report of the Iraq Study Group is out. (Summary available here.) A couple of thoughts that are prompted by it:

  • Firstly there is the interesting shift in US discourse to blaming the Iraqis, as if, somehow, they had brought all this upon themselves.
  • Then there’s the Report’s central idea — that a timetable should set for the Iraqis to get their house in order, after which the US will go home — in 2008. But there’s no evidence so far that the Iraqi government has a hope in hell of getting a grip on the situation. The chaos and carnage will, in all likelihood, get worse. So will the US then walk away? The Report seems to envisage no Plan B.

    I saw a suggestion recently on a Blog somewhere (can’t remember where, to my chagrin) that one way of rating US presidents is on how long it takes to clear up after them. On that metric, even Ronald Reagan looks reasonable. But Dubya is a catastrophe.

    Another interesting thing: there was a report on the BBC today (also here) that George Bush Snr burst into tears recently at a public event when he was introducing his other boy, Jeb (Governor of California). What can this mean?

  • Kissinger the courtier

    Very nice piece by Joe Hagan in New York Magazine in which he attempts to deconstruct the man I once described (in my Observer column) as “the patron saint of cement mixers”. It opens thus:

    The elevator doors open onto Henry Kissinger’s offices to reveal a bulletproof bank teller’s window. The carpets are worn, the walls in need of fresh paint, the wing chairs stained by the hands of a thousand waiting dignitaries. In a corner sits a large planter holding the dried stumps of a long-dead bamboo tree. A Ronald Reagan commemorative album and a picture book of Israel collect dust on a shelf next to a replica of an ancient Greek bust with a missing nose. Across from Kissinger’s door his hundreds of contacts—presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and corporate titans—are catalogued in eight flywheel Rolodexes on his secretary’s desk.

    And then you hear it: The Voice, a low rumble from around the corner, like heavy construction on the street outside. When he finally appears, Kissinger—architect of the Vietnam War’s tortured end, Nixon confidant and enabler, alleged war criminal, and Manhattan bon vivant—is smaller than expected: stooped and portly, dressed in a starched white shirt and pants hoisted by suspenders, peering gravely through his iconic glasses. He’s almost cute.

    At 83, Kissinger has had heart surgery twice, wears two hearing aids, and is blind in one eye. His once-black hair has turned snowy white. But his presence is startling nonetheless, his Germanic timber so low and gravelly everyone else sounds weak by comparison. He starts our conversation on this late-October morning by placing a silver tape recorder on the coffee table.

    “I want a record,” he says.

    Most of Hagan’s interview reminds him of playing chess with a grandmaster — except in this case, Kissinger is a master of obfuscation. There’s a lot of to-ing and fro-ing over a quote in Bob Woodward’s book, State of Denial, which depicts Kissinger as privately advising President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney on the war in Iraq, calling him a “powerful, largely invisible influence.” Woodward’s portrays Kissinger as a surreptitious Rasputin, cooing in the presidential ear that “victory is the only exit strategy,” urging him to resist all entreaties to change course. Kissinger flatly denies this to Hagan, who then goes on to write:

    Bob Woodward is amused when I tell him that Kissinger believes he “happens to be wrong” about his influence over the Bush administration. “

    Is Kissinger backtracking on Iraq?” He laughs. No matter. “What I’m reporting is the view of people like Cheney and people in the White House about Kissinger’s influence,” he says, “not Kissinger’s evaluation of his influence.”

    Kissinger admitted to Woodward that he has met with Cheney every month and the president every other month since he took office. Whether this constitutes influence depends on your definition of influence: No doubt, Kissinger never minded being seen as influential, but he argues that meeting with the president half a dozen times a year hardly makes him the architect of a policy. Woodward counters that a total of 36 hours over six years adds up to more time with the president than almost any outsider ever.

    Kissinger’s advice to Bush and Cheney, says Woodward, was “very soothing. That’s why they talked to him. It’s all part of the refusal to face reality. If you go back to the Nixon tapes, he’s a flatterer.”

    Some of Kissinger’s closest friends are skeptical of his influence on the White House for this very same reason: his legendary sycophancy. Kissinger, they say, didn’t tell Bush and Cheney anything they didn’t want to hear.“

    It’s good advertising for Kissinger, and it’s good advertising for the president,” says Brent Scowcroft. “They love that—especially Henry Kissinger—if they can go out and say, ‘Henry agrees with us.’ They want his support, they don’t want his views.”

    “I think he likes to please people too much,” says Melvin Laird, the secretary of Defense during the Nixon administration. “You’ve got to be a little bit of a son of a bitch sometimes.” (Laird would know: During the Nixon years, he and Kissinger battled so fiercely for influence that Laird had Kissinger’s phone tapped to gain advantage.)

    “The tragedy of Henry Kissinger is that he is a very large intellect joined to a very small man,” says Mark Danner, a foreign-policy writer who knows Kissinger. “No one is more brilliant, but in offering advice to policy-makers he invariably lets his obsession with his own access and influence corrupt what should be disinterested advice, tailoring his words to what he thinks the powerful want to hear. As a matter of character, he is more courtier than thinker.”

    En passant, Hagan reveals that Dubya

    appointed Kissinger chairman of the 9/11 Commission, a position that would have put him at the forefront of the national debate on U.S. intelligence failures and capped a long public career with a crowning achievement.

    In the vetting process, however, Kissinger ran into a snag. Five years after he left office, the former secretary of State had founded the consulting firm Kissinger Associates and established himself as a kind of diplomatic fixer who could work the back rooms of Moscow, Beijing, and Riyadh for corporations needing influence. He charges $200,000 (a reported $50,000 just to walk through the door) to consult for companies like Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., a mining company with assets in Indonesia. As much as Kissinger wanted to be the nation’s healer, he valued his business interests more. When Congress requested that he reveal his consulting firm’s client list, he stepped down from the commission.

    Hagan also reminds us of Seymour Hersh’s assessment of Kissinger: “He lies like most people breathe.” And of the fact that he was once a great friend of Conrad Black.

    Memo from Don

    Two days before he resigned, Donald Rumsfeld wrote a classified Memo to the White House which has now been leaked to the New York Times.

    The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options…

    The ‘options’ include:

  • Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
  • Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)
  • Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
  • Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
  • Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
  • Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
  • Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
  • Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.
  • Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.

    [JN: Well, well…]

  • Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.
  • Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.”

    [In other words, manage public expectations. Who says Rumsfeld never listened to Tony Blair?]

  • Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.

    [see above re expectations]

  • This is an amazing document, not because of what it says, but because of who authored it. As he once famously said, “stuff happens”, which is actually a way of absolving himself of responsibility.

    A hyperpower in thrall to its client

    Well, well. In Barbara Tuchman’s terrific study of ‘misgovernment’, The March of Folly, she points out one of the strange paradoxes of the war in Vietnam. As the conflict deepened, the government of South Vietnam weakened steadily; but the weaker the Saigon regime became, the greater the influence it was able to exert over the US.

    And now in Iraq we see the same thing happening. See this report in today’s New York Times.

    BAGHDAD, Nov. 28 — When President Bush meets in Jordan on Wednesday with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq, it will be a moment of bitter paradox: at a time of heightened urgency in the Bush administration’s quest for solutions, American military and political leverage in Iraq has fallen sharply.

    Dismal trends in the war — measured in a rising number of civilian deaths, insurgent attacks, sectarian onslaughts and American troop casualties — have merged with growing American opposition at home to lend a sense of crisis to the talks in Amman. But American fortunes here are ever more dependent on feuding Iraqis who seem, at times, almost heedless to American appeals, American and Iraqi officials in Baghdad say.

    They say they see few policy options that can turn the situation around, other than for Iraqi leaders to come to a realization that time is running out. It is not clear that the United States can gain new traction in Iraq with some of the proposals outlined in a classified White House memorandum, which was compiled after the national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, visited Baghdad last month.

    Many of the proposals appear to be based on an assumption that the White House memo itself calls into question: that Prime Minister Maliki can be persuaded to break with 30 years of commitment to Shiite religious identity and set a new course, or abandon the ruling Shiite religious alliance to lead a radically different kind of government, a moderate coalition of Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish politicians…

    In an essay published before the US went to war in Iraq, Warren Bennis gives a useful summary of Tuchman’s concept of ‘misgovernment’:

    In March of Folly, author Barbara Tuchman identifies several types of “misgovernment,” the most tragic of which is folly. Folly occurs when a government pursues policies contrary to the nation’s self-interest. To be classified as folly, misgovernment must satisfy three conditions. First, the misguided policy must be perceived as counter-productive, in its own time; that is, the decision not only looks stupid now, through the shining ether of time, but it looked hugely problematical in its day. Second, other feasible options must be known but rejected. Finally, the questionable policy must be more than the will of an individual leader. It must be shared and propped up by those around the leader, the product of a sort of group-think. Through that prism, Tuchman analyzes four egregious leadership failures: King Priam opening the gates of Troy to the Greeks; the actions of the Renaissance Popes that hastened the Reformation they so feared; King George III’s loss of the American colonies; and, finally and perhaps most relevant today, the Viet Nam war.

    In writing about Vietnam, George Kennan observed that Lyndon Johnson and his inner-circle–Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, and the Joint chiefs–were like “men in a dream, incapable of any realistic assessment of the effects of their own acts.” Today, we see the cortege of folly moving us inevitably toward a war with Iraq. And eerily like LBJ’s “men in a dream,” President Bush and his advisors are leading the march, acting out of sheer wish and will, not allowing nettlesome facts and uncertainties to deter them.

    Bennis’s essay is very interesting — worth reading in full. Here’s the bit that caught my eye:

    I found myself recalling a principle I learned more than 50 years ago while attending the London School of Economics. I was invited to participate in a training group at the famed Tavistock Clinic for those interested in the emerging practice of group psychotherapy. Its leader was renowned psychiatrist Wilfred Bion, who understood the dynamics of group behavior as well as anyone I’ve ever known. Bion’s insights were simple and profound. And, first among them, was that the leader must avoid, at all costs, getting overly involved with the sickest member of the group.

    Focus on the sickest, he warned prospective leaders, and you will undermine yourself in numerous ways. You will polarize the group. The healthier members will begin to resent you and even question the legitimacy of your leadership. They will tend to sit sulkily by while you try single-handedly to detoxify the troublemaker. The only way deal with the sickest member, Bion counseled, is to leave space for the healthier ones to take the problem on collectively. Over-reacting to extreme pathology is the most predictable and serious mistake a leader can make, Bion argued, because it steals responsibility from those who should assume it–the healthier members of the group.

    Iraq death toll rises

    From today’s New York Times…

    BAGHDAD, Nov. 22 — More Iraqi civilians were killed in October than in any other month since the American invasion in 2003, a report released by the United Nations on Wednesday said, a rise that underscored the growing cost of Iraq’s deepening sectarian war.
    According to the report, 3,709 Iraqis were killed in October, up slightly from the previous high in July, and an increase of about 11 percent from the number in September.

    The figures, which include totals from the Baghdad morgue and hospitals and morgues across the country, have become a central barometer of the war here and a gauge of the progress of the American military as it tries to bring stability to this exhausted country.

    A dangerous trend has surfaced: Sixty-five percent of all deaths in Baghdad were categorized as unidentified corpses, the signature of militias, who kidnap, kill and throw away bodies at a rate that now outstrips the slaughter inflicted by suicide bombers. The report did not offer a breakdown by sect, and it is impossible to tell who is dying in greater numbers.

    Indeed, the 52 bodies found by the authorities on Wednesday were far more than the 16 Iraqis reported killed in Baghdad and Baquba, a violent city north of the capital.

    “We have a situation in which impunity prevails,” said Gianni Magazzeni, chief of the United Nations’ Human Rights Office in Baghdad, which compiled the report. “It’s critically important for the government to ensure that justice is done.”

    Even daily life spoke of war and a society in collapse. The report painted a portrait of social calamity that included 100,000 Iraqis a month fleeing to Syria and Jordan, and schools in some of the most violent areas of the country almost completely shut down. Areas that are not mixed — Iraq’s Kurdish north and portions of its Shiite south — were far safer.

    The figures illustrate in stark percentages just how deeply the killing has sunk into Iraqi society. They had been a point of contention for the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, which suppressed them in September after criticizing them as inflated. The American military has also criticized the figures as high, but it does not release statistics of its own.

    President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are preparing for meetings next week with Mr. Maliki, in part to discuss the security situation in Iraq.

    But the United Nations stands by the count, which tallies unclaimed bodies from Iraq’s approximately six morgues and from death certificates — required for burial and for inheritance procedures. If anything, the numbers are low. Figures from hospitals come from the Ministry of Health, which counts deaths only on the day of the attack. Victims who die a day later are not counted…

    Who’s Rumsfeld?

    … The sergeant went upstairs to tell his marines, just as he had informed them the day before that the Republican Party had lost control of the House of Representatives and that Congress was in the midst of sweeping change. Mr. Menti had told them that, too.

    “Rumsfeld’s out,” he said to five marines sprawled with rifles on the cold floor.

    Lance Cpl. James L. Davis Jr. looked up from his cigarette. “Who’s Rumsfeld?” he asked.

    If history is any guide, many of the young men who endure the severest hardships and assume the greatest risks in the war in Iraq will become interested in politics and politicians later, when they are older and look back on their combat tours.

    But not yet. Marine infantry units have traditionally been nonpolitical, to the point of stubbornly embracing a peculiar detachment from policy currents at home. It is a pillar of the corps’ martial culture: those with the most at stake are among the least involved in the decisions that send them where they go.

    From the NYT via Truthdig.

    Diplomatic notices



    BRITISH CONSULATE
    Basra: Iraq

    Opening Times

    SUICIDE BOMBINGS
    9.30am – 3.30pm
    Monday to Friday

    Those wishing to bomb the
    Consulate outside those hours
    must apply in writing at least
    two weeks before they hope
    to embark on their journey to
    paradise.

    MORTAR ATTACKS
    11.00am – 2.00pm
    Monday/Wednesday/Friday

    No incoming mortar attacks
    will be accepted outside these
    times.

    From this week’s Private Eye.

    Krugman: Limiting the Damage

    From Paul Krugman’s NYT column

    At this point, nobody should have any illusions about Mr. Bush’s character. To put it bluntly, he’s an insecure bully who believes that owning up to a mistake, any mistake, would undermine his manhood — and who therefore lives in a dream world in which all of his policies are succeeding and all of his officials are doing a heckuva job. Just last week he declared himself “pleased with the progress we’re making” in Iraq.

    In other words, he’s the sort of man who should never have been put in a position of authority, let alone been given the kind of unquestioned power, free from normal checks and balances, that he was granted after 9/11. But he was, alas, given that power, as well as a prolonged free ride from much of the news media.

    The results have been predictably disastrous. The nightmare in Iraq is only part of the story. In time, the degradation of the federal government by rampant cronyism — almost every part of the executive branch I know anything about, from the Environmental Protection Agency to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has been FEMAfied — may come to be seen as an equally serious blow to America’s future…

    It’s a good piece. It concludes:

    But here’s the thing: no matter how hard the Bush administration may try to ignore the constitutional division of power, Mr. Bush’s ability to make deadly mistakes has rested in part on G.O.P. control of Congress. That’s why many Americans, myself included, will breathe a lot easier if one-party rule ends tomorrow.

    Saddam’s trial

    From Scott Rosenberg’s Wordyard

    I don’t think the White House needed any “scheming.” The Iraqi court knows exactly what its “mission” is without being explicitly ordered. Coordination doesn’t require command.

    The simple fact remains: this verdict represents a last-minute spasm of the GOP’s desperate hang-on-to-power campaign. And the White House is doing its Orwellian part in loudly denying the fact and protesting the Iraqis’ independence.

    Sadly for them, the election’s outcome won’t really make a difference to the bloodshed in Iraq, the dynamics of which long ago spun out of American control. And once U.S. forces have abandoned the wreckage of the occupation, how long do you think Saddam’s judges have left to live?

    Say, where does the plutonium go in this thing?

    That Saddam knew a thing or two. The NYT reports that,

    Last March, the federal government set up a Web site to make public a vast archive of Iraqi documents captured during the war. The Bush administration did so under pressure from Congressional Republicans who had said they hoped to “leverage the Internet” to find new evidence of the prewar dangers posed by Saddam Hussein.

    But in recent weeks, the site has posted some documents that weapons experts say are a danger themselves: detailed accounts of Iraq’s secret nuclear research before the 1991 Persian Gulf war. The documents, the experts say, constitute a basic guide to building an atom bomb.

    Last night, the government shut down the Web site after The New York Times asked about complaints from weapons experts and arms-control officials. A spokesman for the director of national intelligence said access to the site had been suspended “pending a review to ensure its content is appropriate for public viewing.”